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Herding Schrödinger’s Cats: The Limits of the Social
Science Approach to International Law
Simon Chesterman

Abstract
The struggle to assert the legitimacy and relevance of international law is integral to its
story. Among academics, that tale has seen other lawyers question whether it is “really” law,
while scholars of international relations have dismissed it in a bemused footnote. Among
politicians, the narrative has been one of efforts to establish international law as more than simply
one foreign policy justification among others. The turn to social science offers a double remedy:
rigorous methods that will earn the respect of the academy while also demonstrating the discipline’s
“real world” impact. This is an elegant answer—to the wrong question. For the problems of
international law cannot be solved by adopting an “external” and therefore objective or privileged
position. International law’s structure and history make academics necessarily participants as
well as observers. An uncritical embrace of social science methods risks losing much of what draws
people to international law and what has, over the centuries, given it value. As a work in progress
in which academics have a special role to play, a commitment merely to take international law
“as it is” is not neutral; it is a value statement in itself.



Dean and Provost’s Chair Professor, National University of Singapore Faculty of Law. This Article
was presented at the Chicago Journal of International Law’s symposium on “The Transformation of
International Law Scholarship,” held at the University of Chicago and online on February 26, 2021.
Many thanks to Griffin Clark, Tom Ginsburg, Katherine Luo, Ana Carolina Luquerna, and Jared
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
The subject of international law has always struggled to be taken seriously.
Much of that struggle has been over its status as “law,” with H.L.A. Hart among
others expressing serious reservations about such a claim.1 More recently, Anthea
Roberts has questioned the extent to which it can be said to be “international,”
given divergences in the way it is taught and understood around the world.2 Now
Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton, and Tom Ginsburg are raising an eyebrow as to
whether it even deserves to be considered a “subject” in the academic sense—
proposing that this would be bolstered through recognizing and expanding the
social science methods described in their Essay. Such an approach will, they argue,
produce research that is more “normatively restrained, empirically informed, and
more skeptical”3—by which they mean “better.”
I will push back against these explicit and implicit claims in two ways.
First, analytically, their Essay and its plan of action misdiagnose the nature
of international law scholarship, or a substantial part of it, by embracing the idea
of an “external” and therefore objective or privileged position. Without
subscribing to the maximalist claim that objectivity itself is impossible, I will argue
that international law’s structure and history necessarily make academics
participants as well as observers. Second, politically, a wholesale embrace of social
science methods would lose much of what draws people to international law and
what has, over the centuries, given it value. As a work in progress in which
academics have a special role to play, a commitment merely to take international
law “as it is” is not neutral; it is a value statement in itself. I will conclude by
explaining the somewhat labored metaphor in my title.

II. T HE P ROJECT OF I N TERNATIONAL L AW
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s argument is, at its core, about method. “For
over a hundred years,” they observe, “scholars have argued that international law
should be studied using a ‘scientific’ approach.”4 And yet they also observe that
the methods that those scholars have used have been, to put it politely, lacking in
1

2

3

4

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213–37 (2d ed. 2012) (concluding that international law
constitutes a set of rules but not a system of law, as it lacks a basic norm providing general criteria
of validity for other norms within that system).
ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? (2017). A distinct critique is the
extent to which non-Western states participated in the development of international law and
institutions. See Simon Chesterman, Asia’s Ambivalence about International Law and Institutions: Past,
Present and Futures, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 945 (2016).
Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International Law, 22
CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 23 (2021).
Id. at 1.
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scientific rigor. International lawyers invented their own approaches on the fly—
not so much methods as sets of “assumptions and theoretical claims.”5 No
wonder, one might draw the conclusion, that two international lawyers routinely
find three different answers to a given question. The solution proffered to solve
this problem is the tried and tested methods of social science. The authors are
modest in their argument but cannot hide their apparent mystification as to why
this was not evident to serious researchers up to now.6
By social science methods, they mean the formulation of questions,
development of hypotheses that can be tested with qualitative or quantitative data,
and offering of conclusions while acknowledging underlying assumptions and
uncertainty.7 An important part of their critique is that this should be done in an
“external” manner: “that is, an approach that examines the law from outside,
seeking to explain how it came to be or what its consequences might be in the real
world.”8
This is an elegant answer—to the wrong question.
Because international law is not like other subjects of social scientific
research, for one-and-a-half reasons. The half reason, which is not a compelling
one, is that international law—its study and its practice—has always had an
undercurrent of idealism. I do not mean idealism in the international relations
sense,9 though the two are connected in that idealism in the theoretical sense
underpins a strong vein of international law scholarship. Rather, I mean a more
general sense of having an unrealistic belief in, or the pursuit of, perfection.
International law and international lawyers have always conflated the “is” and the
“ought.”10 Anyone who has taught international law knows the experience of
having to explain to students that “real world” suffering may not be addressed by
international law remedies. The maxim “no wrong without a remedy” may be true
in the courts of equity, but it holds no water in the International Court of Justice.11
5
6

7
8
9

10

11

Id. at 5, n.14.
See also Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106
AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2012).
Abebe et al., supra note 3, at 5.
Id.
See generally MARTIN GRIFFITHS, REALISM, IDEALISM AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: A
REINTERPRETATION (1992).
See, e.g., Andreas Th. Müller, The Effectiveness-Legitimacy Conundrum in the International Law of State
Formation, in THE NORMATIVE FORCE OF THE FACTUAL: LEGAL PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN IS AND
OUGHT 79 (Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac, Christoph Bezemek & Frederick Schauer eds., 2019).
In the domestic context, see, for example, Leo Feist v. Young, 138 F.2d 972, 974 (7th Cir. 1943)
(citing it as “an elementary maxim of equity jurisprudence”). In international law, by contrast,
remedies were long neglected in the literature and the Statute of the International Court of Justice
provides little guidance on their application. Ian Brownlie, Remedies in the International Court of Justice,
in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR ROBERT
JENNINGS 557–58 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996).
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As I noted, this is not a good reason, and we academics are not immune to
the desire to make international law better. Indeed, it has often encouraged
overstretch. To be fair, this has typically been on the progressive side—one need
only think of the efforts in the early 1990s that led to the new interventionism that
sought to promote human rights through righteous violence.12 Two problems
resulted. First, the deaths of U.S. Rangers in Somalia in 1993 showed the limits of
political commitment to such projects—particularly in Africa.13 Second,
international lawyers tied themselves in knots to justify the 1999 Kosovo
intervention when there was political commitment, but the authorization that
would have added legality was not forthcoming.14 Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg
quote the infelicitous phrase “illegal but legitimate” to describe this phenomenon,
a circumlocutory approach that sought to have its cake and bomb it too.15
Another example of idealism is the efforts through that same decade to hold
businesses accountable for human rights violations. Coincidentally, my only other
article in the Chicago Journal of International Law was on this topic, discussing among
other things the manner in which activists and scholars sought to take human
rights norms applicable to states and extend them to corporations also—
essentially through sheer force of will.16 When John Ruggie criticized the
“doctrinal excesses” and “exaggerated legal claims” of such writers,17 he was
accused of attempting to “derail the standard-setting process and bow to the
corporate refusal to accept any standards except voluntary codes.”18
This may sound like special pleading for international law, and, to some
extent, it is. But the better reason for distinguishing international law from other
subjects of social scientific research is that academics have always been
participants rather than mere observers in our field. This is partly because our
subject matter is incomplete; there are lacunae.19 Indeed, it is sometimes said that
12

13

14

15

16

17

See generally THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM 1991–1994: UNITED NATIONS EXPERIENCE IN
CAMBODIA, FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND SOMALIA (James Mayall ed., 1996).
See, e.g., Thomas G. Weiss, Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome—“Operation Rekindle Hope?”, 1 GLOB.
GOVERNANCE 171 (1995).
See SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 211–18 (2001) and sources there cited.
INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 4 (2000),
https://perma.cc/35FG-5XG4.
Simon Chesterman, Lawyers, Guns, and Money: The Governance of Business Activities in Conflict Zones, 11
CHI. J. INT’L L. 321, 327 (2011).
John Gerard Ruggie, Special Representative, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006), ¶ 59.

18

David Weissbrodt, International Standard-Setting on the Human Rights Responsibilities of Business, 26
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 373, 390 (2008).

19

See, e.g., Prosper Weil, “The Court Cannot Conclude Definitively . . .” Non Liquet Revisited, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 109 (1998).
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the relationship between international law and law is similar to that between Swiss
cheese and regular cheese—similar in substance, but a lot more holes.
More seriously, international law is very unlike domestic law in two ways.
Structurally, domestic law can be thought of as having a vertical relationship
between sovereign and subject; international law operates—at least theoretically—
in a realm where states exist in a horizontal plane of sovereign equality.20 As a
result, a great many substantive international legal questions are left without
conclusive answers. Is humanitarian intervention permissible? What is the legal
status of Taiwan, of Kosovo, of Palestine? The International Court of Justice
(ICJ), tasked with giving answers, often dodges them. When asked for an advisory
opinion on the secession of Kosovo from Serbia, for example, it neatly answered
a different and far less controversial question.21 Even when the ICJ does give
answers, they may be contradictory. Within the space of three years, for example,
it concluded that Serbia both was22 and was not23 the successor state to the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the purposes of ICJ Jurisdiction.
Nature and the academy abhor a vacuum, so academics fill this uncertainty.
There is, as we know, a normative basis for this. The ICJ Statute itself lists as a
subsidiary source of law “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
the various nations.”24 From Grotius’s battle of the books to modern lawfare,25
international law has always provided scope for academics to be advocates as well
as analysts.
The position articulated here is an unashamedly internal view of the discipline.
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg allow for this, noting that internal scholarship has
played a “particularly prominent”—surprisingly prominent, they seem to mean—
role.26 But their call to abandon labels and to avoid “committing oneself to any
20
21

22

23

24

25
26

See generally Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 331 (2008).
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403 (July 22). Instead of addressing the matter of
Kosovo’s asserted independence, the Court chose to focus on the legal significance of its declaration
of independence, concluding that international law has no prohibitions on such declarations—and
leaving unanswered the question of whether the declaration had any legal effect.
Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. and Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43 (Feb.
26).
Legality of the Use of Force (Serb. and Montenegro v. U.K.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 1307 (Dec.
15).
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 art. 38(1)(d). And just
as ninety percent of faculty members generally regard themselves as “above average” teachers, few
international law professors would put themselves outside the group of “most highly qualified
publicists.” See K. Patricia Cross, Not Can, But Will College Teaching Be Improved?, 17 NEW DIRECTIONS
HIGHER EDUC. 1, 1 (1977).
ORDE F. KITTRIE, LAWFARE: LAW AS A WEAPON OF WAR (2016).
Abebe et al., supra note 3, at 17.
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assumptions, theories, or philosophies beyond those required of any other social
science researcher”27 presumes the ability to be a truly external observer. Some
postmodernists and poststructuralists have made the strong claim that this is
impossible in any circumstance.28 Here, I will confine myself to the more modest
claim that, in the context of international law, the role that academics have played,
and continue to play, in constructing the discourse makes that dispassionate and
disinterested claim dubious.
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg are, of course, aware of all this. Indeed, one
of the two key influences on international law scholarship that they highlight is
the impact of “real-world problems” on the work done by academics. What I think
they underestimate is the converse: the impact of academia itself on the real world
of international law.
This is not to say that the influence of academics has been uniformly
positive. It is sometimes naïve, often misguided, and too frequently patronizing
or colonial in its approach to helping “the other.”29 Sometimes, as at the ICJ,30 the
contradictions are laid bare: those who supported unilateral humanitarian
intervention in Kosovo in 1999, for example, struggled to oppose intervention in
Iraq a few years later—and bristled when Russia invoked the same arguments
more recently in Crimea.31 Perhaps that is why humanitarian intervention has
always been more popular among academics than states.32
Yet, it is hard to deny that academics in international law have had and
continue to have an impact on their subject that is qualitatively different from
other fields of social science. Human rights, international humanitarian law, the
very word “genocide,”33 the one true faith of global administrative law34—all are
examples of the observer turning participant. All are attributable to the work of
academics not just documenting but creating the path of international law.

27

Id. at 6.

28

See, e.g., COLIN DAVIS, AFTER POSTSTRUCTURALISM: READING, STORIES, THEORY (2003).
See, e.g., MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960 (2001); ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).

29

30
31

32

33
34

See supra notes 22–23.
JUAN FRANCISCO ESCUDERO ESPINOSA, SELF-DETERMINATION AND HUMANITARIAN SECESSION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF A GLOBALIZED WORLD: KOSOVO V. CRIMEA 1 (2017).
See Simon Chesterman, “Leading from Behind”: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and
Humanitarian Intervention After Libya, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 279–85 (2011).
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIMES OF CRIMES 25 (2000).
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law,
68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005).
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III. T HE V IEW FROM B E LOW
A second reason to push back against this social science manifesto is that, in
addition to being analytically questionable, it is normatively undesirable.
Politically, the project of international law remains unfinished.
If Oppenheim had been successful in his call for international lawyers to
embrace a scientific method a century ago, few of the advances mentioned in the
previous section would have happened. Oppenheim acknowledged, of course,
that international law was a work in progress, that it was necessary for writers,
“and in especial the authors of treatises, . . . to take the place of the judges and
have to pronounce whether there is an established custom or not, whether there
is a usage only in contradistinction to a custom, whether a recognized usage has
now ripened into a custom, and the like.”35 But there were limits: “the international
jurist must not walk in the clouds; he [sic] must remain on the ground of what is
realizable and tangible. It is better for international law to remain stationary than
to fall in the hands of the impetuous and hot-headed reformer.”36
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg are aware of this as well; they give feminism
and Third World approaches to international law an entire paragraph each.37 They
might respond that these are simply different projects: I am writing from an
unashamedly “internal” angle; their approach is “external.” But the permeability
of these borders is important.
The social scientist, Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg argue, is “engaged in a
positivist enterprise of trying to describe the world as it is, rather than how it
should be.”38 Taking international law “as it is” is a normative position, however—
and in a way different from the maximalist claim that that is true of everything in
the world. The reason is that the international law academic—more, I would
argue, than perhaps any other discipline—has the potential to affect the subject
matter of his or her study. We are not scientists merely observing the phenomena
around us. When U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts claimed in his confirmation
hearings that his job was merely “to call balls and strikes,”39 knowing pundits
rolled their eyes. No ICJ judge would be foolish enough to make such a sporting
analogy. Or if they did, they would at least concede that their role might well be
to call balls and strikes—after they have negotiated where the strike zone was
going to be on that particular day.

35
36
37
38
39

L. Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 313, 315 (1908).
Id. at 318.
Abebe et al., supra note 3, at 13–14.
Id. at 19.
I Come Before the Committee with No Agenda. I Have No Platform, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2005),
https://perma.cc/L6EL-C5KX.
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Assuming or stipulating a measure of objectivity does not dispense with
partiality and partisanship; it merely masks it. That does not mean that the impact
of the academic—or the judge—need be nefarious. It does not even mean that
they will have an impact at all. But they can, and sometimes they will. Being open
about that impact and responsibility does not guarantee that the project of
international law will be a liberating one. Hopefully, however, it reduces the
likelihood that international law will be frozen in time, limiting thereby the voices
that can be heard and the emancipatory projects that remain unfinished.

IV. A BOUT T HOSE C ATS
Which brings me, finally, to the labored double metaphor of my title.
“Herding cats” is, of course, the adage that points to the difficulty—some
would say the futility—of controlling or organizing entities that are inherently
uncontrollable.40 States are, manifestly, not cats. But, like cats, their respect for
authority is episodic at best; when they do not get their way, they may hiss, spit,
or draw their claws. Various international relations theorists have drawn on this
analogy to describe what Hedley Bull termed the “anarchical society.”41
Schrödinger, in turn, is a reference to the famous thought experiment in
which a cat—somehow having been herded into a box—can be both alive and
dead, due to its fate being tied to a random subatomic event. Only when the box
is opened will the cat’s fate be revealed or resolved.42 It should be stressed that
Erwin Schrödinger intended this as a joke to demonstrate the absurdity of
quantum dynamics in the 1930s. Nonetheless, it has come to be taken more
seriously as illustrating that some phenomena only exist in any meaningful sense
when they are observed.
In the same way, the status of many international legal questions—more so,
I would argue, than most phenomena, including human phenomena—remain
ambiguous until they are studied. Indeed, some would argue that they can remain
ambiguous. The late, great Tom Franck, writing on the question of humanitarian
intervention, once observed that sometimes such conduct is lawful, sometimes it
isn’t, “and sometimes it both is and isn’t.”43 I happen to disagree with Tom about

40

Cf. HERDING CATS: MULTIPARTY MEDIATION IN A COMPLEX WORLD (Chester A. Crocker, Fen
Osler Hampson & Pamela R. Aall eds., 1999).

41

HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (4th ed. 2012).
John D. Trimmer, The Present Situation in Quantum Mechanics: A Translation of Schrödinger’s “Cat
Paradox” Paper, 124 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 323 (1980).
Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 204, 204 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O.
Keohane eds., 2003).

42

43
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that one,44 but his point about legal indeterminacy—the lacunae of which I spoke
earlier45—runs through much of modern international law.
This, then, is the more serious criticism of the turn to empiricism in
international legal scholarship, exemplified by this symposium: that it risks
reducing some of the most interesting questions to yes and no answers, or to
problems of coding. The Lead Essay essentially concedes this, with the example
of ongoing debates over the effectiveness of international human rights
agreements.46 Despite using “similar data,” different conclusions are reached—
though there is said to be agreement that “social science should be the way that
debate is resolved.”47 As those methods become more sophisticated and opaque—
as we move from regression analyses to machine learning and artificial
intelligence—we are beginning to see the limits of such approaches, at least in
relation to inherently contested areas of life, like law in general and international
law in particular.48 Such approaches are useful and effective when “facts [can be]
ascertained”49 and when it is possible to maintain an aversion to “normative
commitments.”50 But if one concedes that, for most of the most interesting
questions in international law, facts are contested and determining norms is half
the game—if one concedes that the cat could be either alive or dead or somewhere
in between—then social science methods alone may not be the answer.
To their credit, Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg do not claim theirs is the best
or the only valid approach to researching international law. Their aim is to “build
bridges” between the practice of international law, legal academy, and social
science departments. Without wanting to wholly align myself with the “critical”
school as discussed in their article, an uncritical acceptance of these methods risks
building a bridge to nowhere.
To end where I began, the subject of international law itself has always been
ambivalent about its own status. I struggle to think of a discipline that has spent
so much time and ink agonizing over the very words that should define it. The
debate we are having is therefore as familiar as it is healthy. Moving forward, I
fully expect to see more work taking up Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s invitation
to bring a social science approach to the study of international law.
And I, for one, look forward to fighting against it.
44

CHESTERMAN, supra note 14.

45

See Weil, supra note 19.
See, e.g., BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC
POLITICS (2009); ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014).
Abebe et al., supra note 3, at 21.

46

47
48

See SIMON CHESTERMAN, WE, THE ROBOTS?: REGULATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE
LIMITS OF THE LAW (2021).

49

Abebe et al., supra note 3, at 20.
Id.
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